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Kendall: Defendants’ Burdens Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55: Post-Answer Default

DEFENDANTS’ BURDENS UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 55: POSTANSWER DEFAULTS AND JURISDICTIONAL WAIVERS IN CITY
OF NEW YORK V. MICKALIS PAWN SHOP
Gregory A. Kendall*

I. INTRODUCTION
Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs default
judgments.1 This device allows a plaintiff to gain requested relief after a
defendant has failed to take a required action within a certain
timeframe.2 Its purposes are to keep dockets current and to prevent
dilatory defendants from impeding the speedy disposition of plaintiffs’
claims.3 The text of the rule provides: “When a party against whom a
judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise
defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk
must enter the party’s default.”4 The party seeking relief may then
apply to the court for default judgment.5 If the court enters default
judgment, the litigation ends in a decisive victory for the plaintiff
without regard to the merits of the plaintiff’s claim.6
At a minimum, the threat of default judgment requires defendants to
respond to the complaint in a timely fashion. However, Rule 55’s
language “plead or otherwise defend” is open to interpretation. Is it
enough merely to respond to the complaint or file a motion to dismiss?
Or must a defendant participate in the litigation all the way through to
the final judgment? The defendant’s burden in each case is vastly
different. When only a responsive pleading or motion to dismiss is
required, a defendant may be able to expend little effort and minimal
costs in forcing a plaintiff to prove the case on the merits. In contrast,
where the defendant must participate fully all the way through to the end
of trial, the defendant can incur significant costs and burdens associated
with complex and protracted litigation.
Defendants who have
meritorious defenses but are forced to withdraw from litigation due to
* Associate Member, 2011–12 University of Cincinnati Law Review; Executive Editor, 201213.
1. FED. R. CIV. P. 55. All references to “Rule 55” and other rules throughout this Casenote will
refer to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise noted.
2. 46 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 232 (2011).
3. Id.
4. FED. R. CIV. P. 55(a).
5. FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2). Rule 55(b)(1) allows the clerk to enter judgment sua sponte in
cases where the relief sought is a definite sum of money and where the plaintiff has submitted an
affidavit showing the amount due.
6. See 46 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 232 (2011).
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financial constraints have the most to lose under this approach.
In May 2011, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in City of New
York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, highlighted a growing split among
the federal circuit courts as to exactly what Rule 55 requires of
defendants.7 The defendant, a pawn shop from South Carolina,
voluntarily withdrew from litigation almost two years after the filing of
the complaint, seeking to conserve its limited resources to defend
pending criminal charges.8 Until then, Mickalis Pawn Shop had
participated in discovery and filed numerous motions to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2).9 In affirming the district
court’s entry of default judgment, the Second Circuit recognized a
conflict between its own interpretation of Rule 55 and the interpretation
embraced by the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, which do not recognize a
“post-answer default” under Rule 55.10
This casenote analyzes the Second Circuit’s decision in Mickalis
Pawn Shop. Part II provides a background on entry of default and
default judgments under Rule 55. Part III analyzes the Second Circuit’s
opinion in Mickalis Pawn Shop. Part IV critiques the Second Circuit’s
application of the majority rule, arguing that application of the minority
rule under the circumstances of the case is more consistent with the
plain language, policy rationales, and history of Rule 55. Finally, Part V
concludes by suggesting that the Second Circuit should have applied the
minority rule’s narrower interpretation and declined to enter default
judgment against Mickalis Pawn Shop.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Default Judgments Under Rule 55
Rule 55 establishes a two-part process by which a plaintiff can seek
default judgment. Rule 55(a) directs the clerk of court to enter a default
against a defendant who has “failed to plead or otherwise defend” when

7. 645 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2011).
8. Id. at 122.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 31. This Casenote will use the phrase “post-answer default” to refer to defaults that
occur after the defendant has answered the complaint, as discussed in further detail below. For the sake
of simplicity, the Casenote will refer to defendants’ burdens under Rule 55, although recognizing that in
rare cases plaintiffs may also be held in default for failure to plead or otherwise defend against a
defendant’s counterclaim. See, e.g., Ringgold Corp. v. Worrall, 880 F.2d 1138, 1139 (9th Cir. 1989)
(per curiam). Although the provisions of Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(vi), which provides for default judgment as a
sanction for failure to comply with the discovery rules, could also be considered a form of post-answer
default, this note will limit the discussion of post-answer default to the defendant’s failure to plead or
otherwise defend in the Rule 55 context.
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that failure is shown “by affidavit or otherwise.”11 Default constitutes
an admission of liability, but not of damages.12 The court may set aside
a default “for good cause.”13
After the clerk has entered default, the party seeking relief must apply
to the court for a default judgment.14 The party against whom default
judgment is sought must be served with written notice of the application
at least seven days before the hearing if that party has appeared
personally or by a representative.15 At its discretion, the court may hold
hearings to conduct an accounting, determine the amount of damages,
establish the truth of allegations by evidence, or investigate other
matters.16 The court may then enter default judgment against the
defaulting party.17 The entry of default judgment converts this
admission of liability into a final judgment, ending the litigation and
awarding the plaintiff the damages to which the court decides the
plaintiff is entitled.18
A defendant against whom a default judgment is entered may make a
motion for relief from the judgment under Rule 60(b).19 When deciding
whether to relieve a party from default judgment under Rule 60(b),
district courts ask: (1) whether the default was willful, (2) whether the
defendant demonstrates the existence of a meritorious defense, and (3)
whether, and to what extent, vacating the default will cause the nondefaulting party prejudice.20 Alternatively, the defendant may appeal
11. FED. R. CIV. P. 55(a).
12. See Mickalis Pawn Shop, 645 F.3d at 128.
13. FED. R. CIV. P. 55(c).
14. FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2). In limited situations, Rule 55(b)(1) requires the clerk to enter
judgment sua sponte in cases where the relief sought is a definite sum of money and where the plaintiff
has submitted an affidavit showing the amount due. However, this subsection applies “against a
defendant who has been defaulted for not appearing.” Id. (emphasis added.)
15. FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2).
16. FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2)(A)–(D).
17. FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2). Various sources emphasize that default judgment is entirely at the
discretion of the district court; it is not an entitlement for the plaintiff. See, e.g., Mason v. Lister, 562
F.2d 343, 345 (5th Cir. 1977) (“[T]he entry of default judgment is committed to the discretion of the
district judge.”); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2685 (3d ed. 2011) (“[It is] clear that the party making the request is not entitled to a default judgment
as of right.”). The court’s discretion to choose not to enter default judgment is justified by the “drastic
nature of a default.” 46 AM. JUR 2D Judgments § 236 (2011).
18. See Mickalis Pawn Shop, 645 F.3d at 128. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(c) limits the court’s discretion
in awarding damages—damages may not exceed the amount sought in the complaint, nor be of a
different type.
19. Rule 60(b) lists the grounds upon which a court may relieve a party from final judgment.
These include excusable neglect, voidness, or “any other reason that justifies relief.” FED. R. CIV. P.
60(b).
20. S.E.C. v. McNulty, 137 F.3d 732, 738 (2d Cir. 2010). For examples of tests used by other
circuits, see Info. Sys. & Networks Corp. v. United States, 994 F.2d 792, 795 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[A]
court should consider three factors: (1) whether the non-defaulting party will be prejudiced; (2) whether
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directly from the default judgment.21
Default judgment is “the most severe sanction which the court may
apply.”22 Its main purposes are to enforce deadlines and to prevent
dilatory defendants from inhibiting the speedy disposition of claims.23
In determining whether default judgment is appropriate, courts balance a
variety of factors, including: (1) the extent of the party’s personal
responsibility, (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to
meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery, (3) a history of
dilatoriness, (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was
willful or in bad faith, (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than
dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions, and (6)
whether the claim or defense is meritorious.24
As a sanction, default judgment is quite powerful, reducing the
plaintiff’s burden of proof on the merits of the claim to a mere formality.
Although Rule 55 grants the court discretion to determine the factual
basis for the plaintiff’s claims and requested damages, ultimately the
plaintiff is excused from the same burdens of production and persuasion
that are required to avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, defeat summary
judgment, and win a case in front of a trier of fact.25 In light of the
the defaulting party has a meritorious defense; and (3) whether culpable conduct of the defaulting party
led to the default.”); Jones v. Phipps, 39 F.3d 158, 162 (7th Cir. 1995) (moving party must show (1)
“good cause” for the default; (2) quick action to correct the default; and (3) the existence of a
meritorious defense). In In re Dierschke, 975 F.2d 181, 184 (5th Cir. 1992), the Fifth Circuit recognized
additional factors, including the public interest, the financial loss to the defendant, and whether the
defendant acted quickly to correct the default. Noting a circuit split over the factors to be considered,
the court explained that the fundamental purpose of the test is to identify circumstances warranting
“good cause” to set aside a default, “informed by equitable principles.” Id.
21. Mickalis Pawn Shop, 645 F.3d at 128. The court describes direct appeals from default
judgment as permissible but unusual. An appeals court reviewing a denial of a defendant’s Rule 60(b)
motion asks whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the judgment. When the
defendant appeals directly from default judgment, the appeals court analyzes whether the trial court
abused its discretion in granting the default judgment in the first place. Id.
22. Id. at 129; see also 46 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 235 (2011) (“The entry of a default
judgment against a party litigant is a harsh and drastic action, invoked only in extreme situations.”); H.F.
Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 432 F.2d 689, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (“[D]efault
judgment must normally be viewed as available only when the adversary process has been halted
because of an essentially unresponsive party.”). Livermore suggests that deterring intentional delay by
defendants is a primary purpose of the threat of default: “the possibility of a default is a deterrent to
those parties who choose delay as part of their litigative strategy.” Id. (emphasis added).
23. 46 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 232 (2011). For additional use of default judgment as a
sanction, see FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(vi), which also makes default judgments available when a
party disobeys a discovery order, or fails to attend its own deposition, answer interrogatories, or respond
to requests for inspection. See, e.g., Home Port Rentals, Inc. v. Ruben, 957 F.2d 126, 133 (4th Cir.
1992).
24. Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984).
25. 46 AM JUR. 2d Judgments § 232 (2011) (“A default judgment is entered without regard to the
merits of the plaintiff’s claim.”). FED. R. CIV. P. 55(d) establishes the burden of proof for a plaintiff
who sues the United States government—in such cases, the plaintiff may obtain default judgment only
“if the claimant establishes a claim or right to relief by evidence that satisfies the court.” The deliberate
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federal courts’ preference for resolving disputes on the merits,26 default
judgment is a windfall to plaintiffs and a serious detriment to
defendants. Due to the harshness with which the rule operates,
defendants have an interest in the certainty of the rule’s interpretation
and application.
B. How the Courts of Appeals Have Interpreted and Applied Rule 55
The federal circuit courts have adopted different interpretations of
Rule 55’s exhortation to “plead or otherwise defend.” Some circuits
interpret this phrase narrowly, requiring the defendant to make attacks
only on service of process or to file responsive pleadings.27 As long as
the defendant answers the complaint, the defendant is not in default, and
the plaintiff must prove its case on the merits before judgment can be
entered for the plaintiff. Other circuits require much more from the
defendant, recognizing a post-answer default whereby the defendant
cannot escape default merely by answering the complaint. These courts
hold that a defendant who withdraws from the suit at any point has
defaulted, and the plaintiff can then win a default judgment without
having to prove its case on the merits.
1. The Broad Interpretation of “Plead or Otherwise Defend”: The
Majority Approach
Among the most common acts leading to post-answer default is
failure to appear at trial. In Goldman, Antonetti, Ferraiuoli, Axtmayer &
Hertell v. Medfit Int’l, Inc.,28 the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
default judgment against a defendant who failed to appear at trial. The
plaintiff, a law firm, sued the defendant to recover unpaid legal fees.
The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for insufficient service of
process and other Rule 12 defenses, and filed cross-claims and
counterclaims.29 The defendant failed to appear at the pretrial settlement
conference. A few days before trial, the defendant informed the court it
would not appear for trial, but did not request a continuance or provide
omission of this language from Rule 55(b) suggests an extremely low burden of proof for plaintiffs
suing private defendants.
26. Mickalis Pawn Shop, 645 F.3d at 129; see also Gomes v. Williams, 420 F.2d 1364, 1366
(10th Cir.1970) (“The preferred disposition of any case is upon its merits and not by default
judgment.”); 46 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 235 (2011) (“Default judgments are not favored . . . [r]ather,
courts generally favor the disposition of litigation on the merits rather than by default judgments.”).
27. See, e.g., Bass v. Hoaglund, 172 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1949).
28. Goldman, Antonetti, Ferraiuoli, Axtmayer & Hertell v. Medfit Int’l, Inc., 982 F.2d 686, 688
(1st Cir. 1991).
29. Id. at 688.
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an excuse.30 The court found the defendant in default when it failed to
appear at trial.31 After a bench trial on the question of damages, the
court entered default judgment.32 The First Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld the entry of default judgment. It found that failure to appear at
trial constituted a default, and that the plaintiff was not required to prove
its case because “an entry of default against a defendant establishes the
defendant’s liability.”33
Failure to respond to discovery or file pretrial memoranda can also
lead to post-answer default. In Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co.,
the defendants failed to respond to discovery requests for witness lists
and documents, and failed to file a pretrial memorandum as required by
court order.34 The defendants justified their actions by explaining that
they were preoccupied with a bankruptcy proceeding in another court.35
On the morning the trial was to begin, an attorney notified the court that
he would be willing to enter an appearance on behalf of the defendants
if a postponement were granted, telling the court that the main defendant
was presently attending the bankruptcy proceeding.36 The judge called
the bankruptcy court, which informed him that the defendant had not
been attending all of the sessions in the bankruptcy proceeding.37 The
court held the defendants in default and entered default judgment after a
hearing to determine damages.38 On appeal, the defendants argued that
they could not be held in default because they had filed an answer and
actively participated in discovery.39 The Third Circuit stated that “the
‘or otherwise defend’ clause is broader than the mere failure to plead.”40
It explained that a defendant could be subject to default judgment for
failing to appear at trial or meet other time schedules, as both these acts
impede the progress of a case.41

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Goldman, 982 F.2d at 693; see also City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645
F.3d 114, 128 (2d Cir. 2011) (“The entry of default, while establishing liability, is not an admission of
damages.”).
34. 980 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1992).
35. Id. at 916–17.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 917.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. The Third Circuit’s test for determining whether a defendant should be held in default
asks (1) whether the plaintiff would be prejudiced by the defendant’s conduct, (2) whether the defendant
has a litigable defense, and (3) whether there is evidence of bad faith or dilatory motive. See
Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2000); Yadav v. Surtees, 87 Fed. App’x 271 (3d
Cir. 2004); Limehouse v. Delaware, 144 Fed. App’x 921 (3d Cir. 2005).
41. Hoxworth, 980 F.2d at 918.
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Intentional, bad-faith conduct can frequently lead to a post-answer
default as well. In Home Port Rentals, Inc. v. Ruben, the parties agreed
to dismiss the suit without prejudice.42 In the consent agreement, the
defendants agreed to submit to the court’s jurisdiction and appoint an
agent to accept service of process if the suit were re-filed within 180
days.43 The plaintiff re-filed, and the defendants’ attorney filed
responsive pleadings in a timely fashion.44 However, after the attorney
had problems contacting the individual defendants at their new
addresses, the attorney moved to withdraw as counsel.45 The district
court issued an order to show cause why the defendants should not be
held in default, and the order was served at the defendants’ last known
addresses.46 Neither the defendants nor their attorney appeared at the
show-cause hearing, and the court granted the attorney’s motion to
withdraw.47 The court held the defendants to be in default, conducted a
hearing to determine damages, and granted default judgment.48 The
Fourth Circuit affirmed the default judgment, finding that the defendants
intentionally made themselves unavailable in the time between the
original dismissal and the default judgment.49 The court also found that
the defendants failed to “otherwise defend” the action by not appearing
at the show-cause hearing and by failing to respond to the trial court’s
certified notices.50
When the defendant is a corporation, another frequent cause of postanswer default is the withdrawal of counsel, followed by the party’s
failure to obtain substitute counsel.51 In Fingerhut Corp. v. Ackra
Direct Mktg. Corp., the plaintiffs brought suit for breaches of contract
and warranty.52 The defendants delayed discovery over a two-year
period by submitting late or non-responsive discovery answers or by

42. Home Port Rentals, Inc. v. Ruben, 957 F.2d 128 (4th Cir. 1992).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 129.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 133.
51. Although 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (2006) permits parties to proceed pro se, the widely accepted
interpretation of the statute holds that it does not apply to corporations. See, e.g., Nat’l Indep. Theater
Exhibitors, Inc. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 748 F.2d 602, 609 (11th Cir. 1984) (“[C]orporations must
always be represented by legal counsel.”). The separate legal existence of a corporation prevents its
directors, officers or other agents from acting pro se on the corporation’s behalf. Id. Thus, failure to
obtain substitute counsel following an attorney’s withdrawal from representation can form the basis for
a finding of default against a corporation.
52. Fingerhut Corp. v. Ackra Direct Mktg. Corp., 86 F.3d 852, 854 (8th Cir. 1996).
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failing to produce requests entirely.53 The defendants’ counsel then
moved to withdraw from representation, citing conflict of interest and
defendants’ failure to pay legal fees.54 Defendants did not obtain
substitute counsel and failed to produce any further discovery requests.55
After the plaintiffs moved for default judgment, defendants filed
affidavits opposing the motion and requesting a sixty-day continuance to
obtain new counsel due to financial difficulties and pending lawsuits in
a different state.56 The court entered default judgment. The Eight
Circuit affirmed the default judgment, explaining that default judgment
is appropriate for “willful violations of court rules, contumacious
conduct or intentional delays.”57 The court found that defendants’
failure to comply with discovery orders, attend pretrial conferences, and
obtain substitute counsel met this standard.58
Thus, the circuit courts that recognize post-answer defaults consider a
wide range of conduct when deciding whether to impose default
judgment. This conduct can include failure to respond to discovery
requests, failure to file pretrial memoranda, failure to appear at pretrial
conferences or trial, and failure to obtain substitute counsel. These
cases suggest that conduct objectively demonstrating a lack of interest in
participating or defending the suit can give rise to default after the
complaint has been answered. Under this broad interpretation of Rule
55, the defendant must both answer the complaint and continue to
participate fully to the end of the litigation, or else be held in default.

53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 855.
56. Id.
57. Id. The court also explained that the existence of a meritorious defense is not sufficient to
avoid default judgment when the defendant has engaged in willful misconduct. Id. at 856–57.
58. Id. The Ninth Circuit similarly found default judgment proper against a plaintiff for the
plaintiff’s failure to defend against a counterclaim, when the plaintiff repeatedly failed to attend pretrial
conferences, or “otherwise participate in or remain informed about the litigation after its counsel
withdrew. Ringgold Corp. v. Worrall, 880 F.2d 1138, 1139 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). This case
places the Ninth Circuit in company with those circuits who follow the majority rule in recognizing
post-answer defaults. But see Pangelinan v. Wiseman, 370 Fed. App’x 818 (9th Cir. 2010). In
Pangelinan, the Ninth Circuit found that the district court properly denied a plaintiff’s request for entry
of default against federal agents in a Bivens action because the defendants had filed timely motions to
dismiss. The court then cited directly to the phrase “plead or otherwise defend” without distinguishing
the case from Ringgold and other Ninth Circuit cases interpreting Rule 55(a). See Beatty v. Warner, 198
Fed. App’x 584 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
plaintiff’s motion for default judgment because the defendants timely answered or filed responsive
pleadings).
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2. The Narrow Interpretation of “Plead or Otherwise Defend”: The
Minority Approach
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Bass v. Hoaglund is
the leading case for the minority approach, which interprets Rule 55
much more narrowly.59 Bass, a Texas resident, was sued in Kansas by a
Kansas citizen for personal injuries.60 Bass appeared by counsel and
filed an answer. Bass’s counsel then withdrew from the case, but did
not withdraw the appearance or answer.61 Bass claimed he was never
notified of his attorney’s withdrawal.62 When the case went to trial,
Bass never appeared, and plaintiff’s counsel was the only person
present.63 The trial court found Bass in default and entered judgment for
the plaintiff in the amount sought in the complaint.64 Bass did not know
about these proceedings until months later.65
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, Bass argued that he had been deprived
of his right to a jury trial in violation of the Seventh Amendment.66 The
Fifth Circuit agreed, explaining that while there is no right to a jury trial
when a default occurs, Bass had not defaulted, because he had made an
appearance and filed pleadings that were never withdrawn.67 Analyzing
Rule 55, the court explained that “otherwise defend” means that the
defendant is not required to have a lawyer or be present when the case is
called for trial.68 It stated, “The words ‘otherwise defend’ refer to
attacks on the service, or motions to dismiss, or for better particulars,
and the like, which may prevent default without presently pleading to
the merits.”69 As a result, Bass was immune from default judgment
when his attorney filed an answer—the failure to appear for trial did not
result in default.70 In such a situation, the plaintiff is required to prove
his case.71 The court found that Bass was entitled to notice of the
default under Rule 55(b).72 As Bass had no reason to think he was in
default, did not know his counsel had withdrawn, and had no notice of
59. 172 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 816 (1949).
60. Id. at 207.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 208.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 208–09 (explaining that the withdrawal by Bass’ counsel did not constitute a
withdrawal by Bass himself, or a withdrawal of his pleadings).
68. Id. at 210.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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the pending default judgment, “to get such a judgment without
evidence” was a violation of due process.73
In Solaroll Shade & Shutter Corp. v. Bio-Energy Systems, the
Eleventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion.74 Solaroll brought a
trademark infringement suit against Bio-Energy, and the parties later
settled.75 Solaroll then filed a motion to reinstate the action, claiming
that Bio-Energy had violated the settlement agreement.76 Bio-Energy’s
counsel received copies of the motion and promised Solaroll’s counsel
to forward a proposed stipulation and motion for extension of time.77
However, Bio-Energy never communicated with Solaroll or responded
to the motion to reinstate.78 As a result, the trial court granted Solaroll’s
reinstatement motion unopposed.79 Bio-Energy filed a motion to vacate
this order under Rule 60(b), arguing in part that the district court failed
to comply with the notice and hearing provisions of Rule 55.80 The
district court denied the motion.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. It stated that the district
court was not required to comply with Rule 55, because by definition its
reinstatement order could not have been a default judgment.81 It
explained that default judgment can be entered against a defendant who
fails to appear or answer a complaint, because “in such circumstances
the case never has been placed at issue.”82 However, “if the defendant
has answered the complaint but fails to appear at trial, issue has been
joined, and the court cannot enter a default judgment.”83 In such
circumstances, the court may proceed to trial without the defendant, and

73. Id. The Fifth Circuit reaffirmed Bass in Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396 (5th Cir.
1981), where the district court entered default judgment against the defendants for failure to appear at
trial. Quoting Bass, the court explained that Rule 55 “does not require that to escape default the
defendant must not only file a sufficient answer to the merits, but must also have a lawyer or be present
in court when the case is called for trial.” Seven Elves, Inc., 635 F.2d at 401, n.2. For examples of state
courts that have followed or endorsed the Bass rule in interpreting local default judgment rules, see
Coulas v. Smith, 395 P.2d 527, 529 (Ariz. 1964); Rombough v. Mitchell, 140 P.3d 202, 205 (Colo. App.
2006); Klein v. Rappaport, 90 A.2d 834, 835 (D.C. 1952); Sharp v. Sharp, 409 P.2d 1019, 1022 (Kan.
1966); Black v. Rimmer, 700 N.W.2d 521, 526 (Minn. App. 2005); Hous. Found., Inc. v. Beagle, 957
A.2d 405 (Vt. 2008).
74. 803 F.2d 1130 (11th Cir. 1986).
75. Id. at 1131.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1133. Those provisions require that a party that has appeared personally or by
representative be served written notice of the application for default judgment at least seven days before
the hearing. FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2).
81. Solaroll, 803 F.2d at 1134.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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the plaintiff can win a favorable judgment only if the plaintiff proves its
case.84 The court found that Bio-Energy had met its burden in the
pleading stage, and the issue had been joined.85 Thus, the Eleventh
Circuit found that the lower court’s order could not have been a default
judgment, and therefore the reinstatement order could not be vacated
under Rule 60(b).86
III. CITY OF NEW YORK V. MICKALIS PAWN SHOP
The May 2011 decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in
City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC presents a post-answer
default situation within the context of a defendant’s challenge to
personal jurisdiction. By finding that the defendants waived their right
to challenge personal jurisdiction on direct appeal, by virtue of
appearing and then defaulting, the Second Circuit illustrates the farreaching effects of post-answer default on waiver of jurisdictional
defenses, and demonstrates the powerful consequences that follow when
courts apply the majority interpretation of “plead or othwerwise
defend.”
A. Facts and Procedural History
In May 2006, the City of New York brought suit in the Southern
District of New York against fifteen licensed firearms dealers operating
in Georgia, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina and Virginia.87 The
City’s complaint alleged, inter alia, public nuisance, and sought
injunctive relief.88 It claimed that the dealers’ sales practices facilitated
illegal purchases of firearms, which then traveled through interstate
commerce and were used to commit crimes in New York City.89
Defendants Mickalis Pawn Shop and Adventure Outdoors operated
single retails store in South Carolina and Georgia, respectively, from
which they made only in-person sales.90
Four defendants, including Mickalis Pawn Shop and Adventure
84. Id.
85. Id. In addition, Bio-Energy’s pleadings were still in effect at the time, and Solaroll never
moved to strike Bio-Energy’s pleadings.
86. Id. at 1135.
87. City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 2011).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 119. Adventure Outdoors also operated websites allowing customers from out-of-state
to place deposits on firearms. However, customers using this method were required to visit the store in
person to complete the sale and obtain the firearm. The store had never sold a firearm to a New York
resident through this method. Id. at 119–20.
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Outdoors, moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule
12(b)(2).91 These motions asserted that the requirements of New York’s
long-arm statute were not satisfied, that the defendants lacked minimum
contacts with New York, and that they had never purposefully availed
themselves of interstate commerce so as reasonably to foresee defending
a lawsuit in New York.92 These motions were all denied on the basis
that the City had made a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction;
the final determination of personal jurisdiction was to be made at trial.93
The court characterized the application of the New York long-arm
statute to public-nuisance suits against nonresident firearms dealers as
“a case of first impression.”94 The defendants’ motion for leave to take
interlocutory appeal was denied.95 New York City amended its
complaint to allege only two causes of action, public and statutory
nuisance, and sought only injunctive relief.96 The defendants made
additional 12(b)(2) motions to dismiss, which were also denied.97
During the discovery phase of litigation in February 2008, almost
twenty-one months after the complaint was filed, Mickalis Pawn Shop’s
owner Larry Mickalis was indicted by a federal grand jury in South
Carolina for knowingly selling firearms to convicted felons.98
Mickalis’s motions to stay the litigation, pending resolution of the
criminal case, were denied.99 A week later, the three law firms
representing Mickalis Pawn Shop moved to withdraw as counsel.100
They explained that Mickalis wanted to concentrate his financial
resources on defending the criminal charges.101 However, the firms
91. Id. at 120–21.
92. Id. The New York long-arm statute, in relevant part, provides: “A court may exercise
personal jurisdiction over any nondomiciliary, or his executor or administrator, who in person or
through an agent . . . (1) Transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods
or services in the state; or . . . (3) commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or
property within the state . . . if he (i) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other
persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services
rendered in the state, or (ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the
state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce . . . .” N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302
(McKinney 2008).
93. Mickalis Pawn Shop, 645 F.3d at 118. The trial court’s order denying the motions stated that
the City had demonstrated that the defendants knew that their reliance on interstate commerce would
cause handguns to end up in New York City where they would be used by criminals to “terrorize
significant portions of the city’s population,” which provided the requisite minimum contacts to satisfy
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a)(3)(ii). Id.
94. Id. at 121.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. The indictment was for violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(d)(1), 924(a)(2) (2006). Id.
99. Mickalis Pawn Shop, 645 F.3d at 122.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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specified that they were not waiving their personal jurisdiction defense
and would continue to raise it.102
At a status conference in March, Mickalis confirmed his consent to
his attorneys’ withdrawal, and his attorneys also announced that
Mickalis did not intend to defend the case further.103 The court warned
Mickalis that default would likely follow if he did not intend to defend
the case further; Mickalis responded that he was aware of the
consequences, but did not expressly consent to entry of default.104 A
week later, the magistrate judge granted the attorneys’ motions for
withdrawal, and after a formal request from the City, entered default
against Mickalis Pawn Shop.105 In June 2008, the City moved for
default judgment, and the district court granted the motion, adopting the
City’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law as its own.106
The court entered default judgment in March 2009 in the form of a
permanent injunction.107
Adventure Outdoors proceeded through the close of discovery, and
then moved for summary judgment based on lack of personal
jurisdiction and preemption of the City’s cause of action by the
Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA).108 This motion
was denied, and the trial court determined that it would proceed to a
bench trial with an advisory jury.109 During jury selection, Adventure
Outdoors’s counsel moved to withdraw from the case, referring to
limited financial resources and the fact that it would not likely win in a
bench trial.110 The court denied the motions to withdraw because the
trial was already underway.111 The court advised counsel that refusal to
proceed with jury selection and other proceedings would likely lead to
default.112 Adventure Outdoors’s counsel confirmed that its client
refused to go forward, but refused to give express consent to default.113
The court noted Adventure Outdoors’s default, and entered default
judgment on the same day as the default judgment against Mickalis

102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 123.
106. Id.
107. Id. The injunction provided for the appointment of a special master and remedial measures
to abate the public nuisance caused by Mickalis’ activities.
108. Id.; 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903 (2006).
109. Mickalis Pawn Shop, 645 F.3d at 124.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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Pawn Shop, over Adventure Outdoors’s objections.114
Mickalis Pawn Shop and Adventure Outdoors appealed directly from
the judgment, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by
finding them in default by virtue of their withdrawal from the
litigation.115 Because they appeared in the litigation over several years
and repeatedly moved to dismiss, filed answers, and “vigorously”
defended in discovery, the defendants argued that they did not “fail[ ] to
plead or otherwise defend” as Rule 55(a) requires.116 They argued that,
because Rule 55(a) was inapplicable, the City was required to prove its
case on the merits by a preponderance of the evidence, including proof
that the court had personal jurisdiction over the defendants under the
state’s long-arm statute and that its claim was not preempted by the
PLCAA.117 Thus, the defendants challenged the default judgment under
Rule 55(b) on three grounds. First, “procedural irregularities” prevented
them from receiving proper notice of the Rule 55 proceedings. Second,
the trial court failed to make a finding by a preponderance of the
evidence that it had personal jurisdiction over the defendants. Third, the
City’s claims were preempted by the federal statute.118
B. Opinion
In its discussion of the entry of default under Rule 55(a), the court
noted that the case did not present a “typical” Rule 55 scenario where a
defendant defaults by failing to file a timely answer.119 Regardless, a
district court may enter default against a defendant who has failed to

114. Mickalis Pawn Shop, 645 F.3d at 124.
115. Id at 128–29. Although the typical method of contesting a default judgment is by motion for
relief from judgment or order under Rule 60(b), direct appeal from a default judgment is permissible.
Rule 60(b) allows relief from a final judgment, order or proceeding under a variety of circumstances.
The trial court’s denial of the motion is then evaluated under an abuse of discretion standard on appeal.
As the Second Circuit explained in Mickalis Pawn Shop, the issue on direct appeal from a default
judgment is whether the trial court abused its discretion in entering default or default judgment in the
first place. Id. at 128.
116. Id. at 128. The court agreed with Mickalis Pawn that it had “‘‘appeared and defended
vigorously’ over the course of ‘about two years of active litigation.’” Id. at 139–40.
117. 15 U.S.C. § 7901 (2006). The court found that both the defendants had waived their
preemption arguments by not raising them on appeal. Mickalis Pawn Shop, 645 F.3d at 137.
118. Mickalis Pawn Shop, 645 F.3d at 131. In its argument regarding procedural irregularities,
Mickalis Pawn argued that the Rule 55 proceedings were inconsistent with due process because it was
no longer able to receive automatic notification of docket activity through the electronic case filing
system after its counsel withdrew. In its opinion, the court responded that Mickalis Pawn actually
participated in the Rule 55 proceedings regardless of its inability to receive automatic updates on docket
activity. Therefore, the default judgment did not result from “a series of ex parte acts” (as Mickalis
Pawn described it), and Mickalis Pawn had an adequate opportunity to be heard. Id. at 132.
119. Id. at 129.
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“otherwise defend.”120 The court explained that it has embraced a
“broad understanding” of the phrase “otherwise defend,” which gives
broad discretion to trial judges, to use default judgment to ensure “the
orderly and expeditious conduct of litigation” by imposing default after
the trial has begun.121 Thus, entry of default is an appropriate response
to a defendant’s “obstructionist litigation tactics.”122
The court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
entering default against either Mickalis Pawn or Adventure Outdoors. It
found that the defendants had affirmatively expressed their intent to
discontinue their participation in the lawsuit, even after they had been
warned that default would likely result.123 According to the court, entry
of default was also proper because Mickalis Pawn had not obtained
substitute counsel after its attorneys withdrew.124 The court summarily
rejected the defendants’ arguments in reliance on Bass. Without
addressing the merits of that decision, the Second Circuit merely stated,
“[Bass’s] interpretation of Rule 55 has not been embraced by this
court . . . nor has it found favor in a majority of our sister circuits.”125
The court addressed the defendants’ arguments that the district court
was required to find that it had personal jurisdiction over the defendants
by a preponderance of the evidence, and that the district court’s failure
to do so constituted a per se abuse of discretion.126 The Second Circuit
declined to respond definitively to this argument, citing its own
precedent which held that a district court “may first assure itself that it
has personal jurisdiction over the defendant” before granting a motion
for default judgment.127 Emphasizing the discretionary language of this
rule, the court explained that it would leave open the question of
whether a district court must determine its personal jurisdiction over a
defendant before entering default judgment. However, it recognized a
split with its sister circuits on this issue.128
120. Id.
121. Id. at 129.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 130.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 131.
126. Id. at 133.
127. Id. (quoting Sinoying Logistics Pte Ltd. v. Yi Da Xin Trading Corp., 619 F.3d 207, 213 (2d
Cir. 2010)).
128. For cases where courts made a finding of personal jurisdiction mandatory before a court
enters default judgment, see Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 6–7 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Sys. Pipe & Supply,
Inc. v. M/V Viktor Kurnatovskiy, 242 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 2001); In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th
Cir. 1999); Dennis Garberg & Assocs., Inc. v. Pack-Tech Int’l Corp., 115 F.3d 767, 772 (10th Cir.
1997). Here, the Second Circuit cited to an earlier ruling where it did vacate a default judgment and
remand to the trial court to determine whether the defendants had actually committed the acts which
would have subjected them to the forum state’s long-arm statute. Credit Lyonnais Sec. U.S.A., Inc. v.
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The court then turned to an extensive discussion in which it found
that the defendants had waived their personal jurisdiction defense,
stating that “a district court should not raise personal jurisdiction sua
sponte when a defendant has appeared and consented, voluntarily or not,
to the jurisdiction of the court.”129 Although recognizing that forfeiture
of personal jurisdiction generally occurs through failure to raise the
defense in responsive pleadings, it explained that in some situations, a
defendant may implicitly submit to the jurisdiction of the court
involuntarily, based on conduct during the litigation.130 The court found
that Mickalis Pawn and Adventure Outdoors had forfeited their
jurisdictional defenses by announcing to the court that they would cease
defending although default would likely follow.131 It rejected the
defendants’ argument that the district court should not have entered
default judgment without determining that there was enough evidence in
the record to sustain a finding of personal jurisdiction by a
preponderance of the evidence.132
The court then addressed the defendants’ argument that the default
judgment was void for lack of personal jurisdiction. Restating its
conclusion that the defendants had waived their jurisdictional defenses
by appearing and then withdrawing, the court explained that the
defendants could no longer challenge the default judgment for voidness
based on lack of personal jurisdiction.133 It explained:
Alcantra, 183 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 1999). In Credit Lyonnais, the court explained that a trial court may
initially deny a defendant’s Rule 12(b)(2) motion “to the extent it attacks the plaintiff’s theory of
jurisdiction without conducting inquiry into the disputed jurisdictional facts, eventually it must
determine whether the defendant in fact subjected itself to the court’s jurisdiction.” 183 F.3d at 154.
The plaintiff has the burden of proving the jurisdictional facts at an evidentiary hearing or at trial before
default judgment can be entered. The Mickalis court neither attempted to distinguish Credit Lyonnais
from the facts in Mickalis, nor explain its conflicting rulings in both cases.
129. Mickalis Pawn Shop, 645 F.3d at 133 (quoting Sinoying, 619 F.3d at 213).
130. Mickalis Pawn Shop, 645 F.3d at 133. The court gave examples of defendants’ conduct
constituting forfeiture, including failing to actively litigate a personal jurisdiction defense until four
years after initially raising it in its answer, or unsuccessfully raising a jurisdictional objection at the
outset but later creating the impression that the defendant has abandoned the defense. See Hamilton v.
Atlas Turner, Inc., 197 F.3d 58, 60–62 (2d Cir. 1999); Rice v. Nova Biomed. Corp., 38 F.3d 909, 914–
15 (7th Cir. 1994).
131. Mickalis Pawn Shop, 645 F.3d at 135.
132. Id. at 136. As authority, defendants relied on D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95
(2d Cir. 2006), where the defendants failed to answer the petition to confirm an arbitral award after
removing the plaintiff’s petition to federal court. The Second Circuit held that the district court was
required to determine whether the plaintiff was actually entitled to the award it sought, regardless of the
defendants’ failure to answer, explaining that “[w]hen a court has before it [an extensive evidentiary]
record, rather than the allegations of one party found in complaints, the judgment the court enters should
be based on the record.” Id. at 109. Here, the Second Circuit distinguishes D.H. Blair by arguing that
that case involved a rare procedural posture brought up under the Federal Arbitration Act, and that
Mickalis Pawn’s case “[did] not concern a scenario in which a court is presented with a complete
evidentiary record from a prior proceeding.” Mickalis Pawn Shop, 645 F.3d at 136.
133. Id. at 138. Judge Wesley’s concurrence highlights the importance of this finding of waiver.
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By submitting to the jurisdiction of the district court to decide the
question of personal jurisdiction—but then withdrawing from the
proceedings, rather than litigating the case to final judgment—the
defendants failed to preserve their jurisdictional defense for review on
appeal . . . [a]nd because they failed to preserve that defense, they
acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the district court, and the resulting
judgment of that court is not void.134

The court found that the defendants’ default was a “deliberate
tactic.”135 It stated that it was “not without sympathy,” for the financial
hardship imposed upon the defendants from being subjected to suit in
New York, but declined to excuse what it believed to be a forfeiture of
personal jurisdiction.136
IV. ANALYSIS
Mickalis Pawn Shop illustrates a post-answer default under a situation
differing markedly from a “simple” default where a defendant fails
entirely to answer the complaint.137 In light of the language of Rule 55,
the history and policy objectives of the rule, and the comparatively low
culpability of Mickalis Pawn in withdrawing from the litigation, the
district court should have applied the Rule 55 analysis advanced by the
Fifth Circuit in Bass and Solaroll and should have used its discretion to
deny the City of New York’s motion for default judgment.
Post-answer defaults are inconsistent with Rule 55’s plain language,
history and policy rationales. By recognizing a post-answer default and
requiring the defendants here both to “plead” and to “otherwise defend”
the lawsuit to the very end, the Second Circuit—and other circuit courts
Judge Wesley disagreed with the district court’s reasoning on the personal jurisdiction issue and
suggested he would not have found personal jurisdiction but for the default. See infra notes 158 to 160
and accompanying text.
134. Mickalis Pawn Shop, 645 F.3d at 140.
135. Id. The court also explained that its decision not to excuse the defendants’ forfeiture of
personal jurisdiction was also based on preserving the policy rationales of the final judgment rule, 28
U.S.C. § 1291 (2006) (“The courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final
decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . .”). It argued that the defendants had attempted
to “short-circuit the normal litigation process by withdrawing, inducing a default judgment to be entered
against them, and then obtaining de facto interlocutory review over otherwise non-appealable
decisions.” Id. at. 141. In the court’s opinion, this would undermine “the policy against piecemeal
litigation.” Id. (quoting Shannon v. Gen. Elec. Co., 186 F.3d 186, 192 (2d Cir. 1999)).
136. Mickalis Pawn Shop, 645 F.3d at 141–42. The court vacated the injunctions, finding them to
be vague and overbroad, and remanded the case to the district court for new injunctions.
137. In In re Gober, 100 F.3d 1195, 1205 (1996), the Fifth Circuit provided helpful terminology
to distinguish between three types of defaults. One is “simple default,” where the defendant fails to
respond to the complaint. Another is “post-answer” default, where the defendant answers the complaint
but does not appear at trial. The third type is the judgment nihil dicit, where the defendant has either
entered a plea of a dilatory nature which fails to place the merits of the plaintiff’s case at issue, or the
defendant has placed the merits at issue in its answer but later withdraws that answer.
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applying the majority interpretation of Rule 55(a)—misread the plain
language of the rule. That rule finds a defendant in default for a “failure
to plead or otherwise defend.”138 The minority interpretation of the
phrase “otherwise defend,” as advanced by Bass, suggests a broad range
of filings and motions a defendant can make in addition to or instead of
pleading to the merits—including “attacks on service, motions to
dismiss, or motions for better particulars.”139 When viewed in
conjunction with the word or in Rule 55(a), the phrase “otherwise
defend” should be interpreted as suggesting responsive pleadings or
other actions to be taken by the defendant in response to the initial
complaint that may take the place of pleading. Thus, Rule 55(a)’s plain
language does not demand that defendants both plead and defend the
lawsuit to conclusion, as the Second Circuit seems to require. Because
the federal courts prefer to use the plain language of the statute to
determine its meaning,140 the minority approach to interpreting Rule
55(a) more accurately reads the word “or” to actually mean “or.” In
contrast, the majority approach incorrectly reads the word “or” to mean
“and,” requiring defendants to file responsive pleadings and to litigate
aggressively to the end. Rule 55(a)’s plain language does not support
such an interpretation.
The minority view as advanced by Bass and Solaroll also has support
from Charles A. Wright and Arthur Miller.141 They explain that the
phrase “otherwise defend” refers to “challenges to such matters as
service, venue, and the sufficiency of the prior pleading, any of which
might prevent a default if pursued in the absence of a responsive
pleading.”142 Wright and Miller agree with Solaroll that “a defendant
who has participated throughout the pretrial process and has filed a
responsive pleading, placing the case at issue, has not conceded
liability.”143 In such a situation, the plaintiff must present evidence
supporting liability, in addition to damages, and can win a favorable
138. FED. R. CIV. P. 55 (emphasis added).
139. Bass v. Hoaglund, 172 F.2d 205, 210 (5th Cir. 1949).
140. United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) (explaining that where the
“words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes . . . are sufficient in and of
themselves to determine the purpose of the legislation . . . a court should follow their plain meaning,”
unless that meaning would lead to absurd or futile results).
141. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 17, § 2682. Wright (1927–2000) held the Charles Alan
Wright Chair in Federal Courts at the University of Texas. Miller (1934–) is a University Professor at
New York University, formerly Bruce Bromley Professor of Law at Harvard University.
142. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 17, § 2682. Moore’s Federal Practice is also in agreement
with this rule, stating that “a party precludes default by ‘pleading’ in response to a claim within the time
allowed.” 10-55 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE—CIVIL § 55.11(2)(a)(i) (2011). “Responsive pleadings”
are those listed in FED. R. CIV. P. 7, which include an answer to the complaint, an answer to a
counterclaim, an answer to a crossclaim, and a third-party answer to a third-party complaint. Id.
143. WRIGHT & M ILLER, supra note 17, § 2682.
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judgment only “if the evidence supports it.”144 Although a defendant
cannot avoid default simply by appearing, “if defendant appears and
indicates a desire to contest the action, the court can exercise its
discretion and refuse to enter a default.”145
The meaning of “plead or otherwise defend” is also informed by the
history of Rule 55. The rule’s text is based substantially on Rules 18
and 19 of the Equity Rules of 1912, governing decrees pro confesso.146
Those decrees were granted for failure to appear within the required
time, or once having appeared, failure to “plead, demur, or answer the
bill within the time limited for that purpose; or if [the defendant] fail[ed]
to answer after a former plea, demurrer or answer is overruled or
declared insufficient.”147 Thus, the decree pro confesso was not
available to the plaintiff if the defendant pleaded, demurred or answered
within the required timeframe, in which case the litigation proceeded ex
parte.148 Thus, the emphasis of the Equity Rules was speedy disposition
144. Id. The requirement that the plaintiff prove its case in an ex parte proceeding absent a
finding of bad faith default has its roots in English common law. If a defendant failed to appear the day
of trial, “the plaintiff, notwithstanding the contumancy of the defendant, only obtained judgment in
accordance with the truth of the case as established by an ex parte examination.” Thompson v. Wooster,
114 U.S. 104, 110 (1885). This was a change from earlier common law, where failure to appear on the
day of trial was deemed a “confession of the action,” allowing the plaintiff to recover the amount
specified in the complaint, regardless of whether it was reasonable. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note
17, § 2681.
145. WRIGHT & M ILLER, supra note 17, § 2682 (emphasis added). This standard, requiring
merely an intent to contest the action, is arguably an even lower standard than that found in Bass and
Solaroll. However, it appears to be consistent with the 2007 amendments to Rule 55, which removed
the phrase “as provided by these rules” after “failed to plead or otherwise defend.” The Advisory
Committee explains that this change was enacted in response to courts’ erroneous interpretations
requiring the defendant to perform an act linked to some other Federal Rule. The Committee explains,
“Acts that show an intent to defend have frequently prevented a default even though not connected to
any particular rule.” FED. R. CIV. P. 55 Advisory Committee Notes, 2007 Amendments. In H.F.
Livermore Corp., the D.C. Circuit also suggested that the defendant’s intent to defend the suit is the
basis for Rule 55(b)’s notice requirements, intended to “protect those parties who, although delaying in
a formal sense by failing to file pleadings within the twenty-day period, have otherwise indicated to the
moving party a clear purpose to defend the suit.” 432 F.2d 689, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1970). For an
application of this principle, see Bravado Int’l Grp. Merch. Servs., Inc. v. Ninna, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 2d
177 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (describing a responsive pleading filed by pro se defendant in trademark
infringement litigation that was held to be sufficient to avoid default, despite not meeting the
requirements of a responsive pleading, because the document clearly indicated the defendant’s intent to
deny specific allegations in the complaint).
146. WRIGHT & M ILLER, supra note 17, § 2681.
147. Thomson v. Wooster, 114 U.S. 104, 112 (1885).
148. FEDERAL EQUITY RULES OF 1912 154–57. Equity Rule 16 states, in relevant part: “It shall be
the duty of the defendant, [unless a time extension has been granted], to file his answer or other defense
to the bill in the clerk’s office . . . in default thereof, the plaintiff may, at his election, take an order as of
course that the bill be taken pro confesso; and thereupon the cause shall be proceeded in ex parte”
(emphasis added). The Equity Rules, perhaps in accordance with equity’s emphasis on fairness,
provided liberal means by which defaulting defendants could redeem themselves; Rule 17, for example,
allows the court to “set aside [the bill pro confesso], or enlarge the time for filing the answer, upon
cause shown upon motion and affidavit,” thereby allowing a defendant in default additional time to
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of the claim; as long as a defendant’s conduct did not prevent the
litigation from moving forward, with or without the defendant’s
appearance, the Rules militated against using a bill or decree pro
confesso to provide an automatic victory to the plaintiff.
A court’s decision to grant default judgment after entry of default is
highly discretionary, and thus the district court in Mickalis Pawn Shop
was not required to do so. Because of the significant merit issues
collateral to the public nuisance claim—including whether the City’s
claim was preempted by the PLCAA and whether the defendants’
conduct was covered by New York’s long-arm statute (an issue of first
impression)—the district court should have required the City to prove its
case on the merits. This is consistent with the federal courts’ general
policy preferring to resolve cases on the merits, especially when there is
doubt over whether a default should be entered.149
A. Mickalis Pawn Should Not Have Been Found in Default
Prejudice to the non-defaulting party is a major factor the federal
courts consider in determining whether a default judgment is an
appropriate sanction.150 Rule 55’s objectives are to prevent a dilatory
defendant from impeding a speedy disposition of the plaintiff’s claims,
and to keep cases moving forward.151 Post-answer defaults implicate
these objectives much less strongly than “simple” defaults. In a simple
default situation, the case cannot move forward until the defendant files
an answer. Therefore, default is an appropriate remedy to the potential
problem of a defendant’s continuous refusal to file an answer, whereby a
defendant could make itself judgment-proof by simply refusing to
acknowledge the existence of a lawsuit.
However, after an answer has been filed and the lawsuit has been set
in motion, the risks of prejudice to the plaintiff caused by delay are less
apparent. In Mickalis Pawn Shop, the case had already been through
discovery and was scheduled for trial. With the defendants having fully
participated in discovery and pretrial conferences, there was nothing left
begin or resume active participation in the litigation. Similarly, Rule 17 “allowed for a setting aside of
the decree pro confesso provided that the defendant “shall undertake to file his answer within such time
as the court shall direct, and submit to such other terms as the court shall direct, for the purpose of
speeding the cause.” Id. (emphasis added).
149. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 17, § 2682; see also Davis v. Parkhill-Goode, 302 F.2d 489,
495 (5th Cir. 1962) (“Where there are no intervening equities any doubt should, as a general
proposition, be resolved in favor . . . of securing a trial upon the merits.”).
150. See S.E.C. v. McNulty, 137 F.3d 732, 738 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Poulis v. State Farm Fire
& Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984) (enumerating the factors for considering the
appropriateness of default judgment, including “prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet
scheduling orders and respond to discovery”).
151. 46 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 232 (2011).
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to prevent the City from fully presenting the merits of its case to the
court ex parte.152 Mickalis Pawn and Adventure Outdoors’s withdrawal
just before trial was the practical equivalent of making an appearance at
trial but actually doing nothing to put on a defense. Unlike a simple
default situation, the City of New York was not disadvantaged or
prevented from obtaining its requested relief by the defendants’
withdrawal. If anything, the City would have been advantaged by the
defendants’ refusal to participate actively in a trial—in an ex parte trial,
the City’s factual claims would not have been rebutted, and the lack of a
defense would have possibly shortened the length of the trial and
reduced expenses. Because the City was not materially disadvantaged
by the defendants’ refusal to participate, an entry of default and
subsequent default judgment were not needed to keep the case moving
forward to conclusion.
Courts considering default judgment also weigh the culpability of the
defendant, and whether the defendant has acted in bad faith.153 Mickalis
Pawn’s conduct in this case does not exhibit the same level of
culpability displayed by other post-answer default defendants. In those
cases cited by Mickalis Pawn Shop as examples of the majority rule, the
defendants’ failures to respond to discovery, attend pretrial conferences,
file pretrial memoranda, provide valid mailing addresses for process
agents, or obtain substitute counsel, were not justified by anything other
than a bad faith motive to delay proceedings. In contrast, Mickalis
Pawn’s withdrawal from the suit was based primarily on Mr. Mickalis’s
desire to devote his limited remaining financial resources to the defense
of his pending criminal charges in South Carolina. It is not unbelievable
to think that a small business, forced to litigate for almost two years in a
distant forum, would eventually find itself with dwindling financial
resources, and it is not impossible to imagine this situation arising again.
One is thus hard-pressed to characterize Mickalis Pawn’s actions as
“willful violations of court rules, contumacious conduct or intentional
delays,” justifying the severe sanction of default judgment.154
Finally, courts also consider whether the defendant has engaged in “a
history of dilatoriness.”155 The defendants here did not cause delay to
any proceedings—in fact, the court’s opinion suggests that the
defendants consistently filed timely motions to dismiss and complied
with all discovery requests. In addition, because discovery had been
completed and the case was about to go to trial, the defendant’s
152. Hypothetically, had the defendants not cooperated in discovery, default judgment under Rule
37(b)(2)(A)(vi) would have been a more appropriate sanction than under Rule 55.
153. See Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868.
154. Fingerhut Corp. v. Ackra Direct Mktg. Corp., 86 F.3d 852, 856 (8th Cir. 1996).
155. Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2013

21

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 8

1100

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81

withdrawal did not create a possibility of delay, as the trial could have
easily proceeded ex parte. Therefore, there was no basis for finding a
history of dilatory tactics on the part of the defendants that would have
justified a default judgment.
B. The City’s Success in an Ex Parte Hearing Would Not Have Been a
Foregone Conclusion.
Where a defendant has not appeared (or has withdrawn from trial),
but has otherwise not been found in default, the plaintiff is not absolved
of its burden of proof. Instead, the plaintiff must continue with its case
and prove its claim on the merits, “just as if the defendant had been
present at trial,” before receiving a favorable judgment.156 Requiring the
plaintiff to prove its case on the merits under the same burden of proof
that would be required of it at trial is not merely an academic exercise in
the absence of the defendant. Although it would be admittedly easier
for a plaintiff to prove its case in an ex parte hearing without an active
adversary to rebut its factual arguments, the difference between the
plaintiff’s burden of proof in an ex parte hearing and the burden of proof
needed to win a default judgment is substantial. Furthermore, “[t]he
requirement that a party whose non-defaulting opponent fails to appear
for trial must prove his case even in the absence of the opposing party
reflects the basic nature of the burden of proof requirements in our trial
system.”157
Under the majority approach, a plaintiff with a case weak on the
merits can obtain a favorable judgment while meeting a minimal burden.
As long as the plaintiff’s case is well-pleaded enough to avoid a Rule
12(b)(6) dismissal, the plaintiff can win the damages specified in the
complaint without regard to the merits or strengths of the case. Rule
55(b) does not demand a factual hearing to determine the merits; rather,
judges may exercise wide discretion in the hearings they hold. As the
cases from the majority approach suggest, a hearing to determine the
exact amount of damages may be held, but is not required.
Under the minority approach, plaintiffs do not win so easily. A
defendant who has responded to the complaint has forced the plaintiff to
156. 46 AM. JUR. 2d Judgments § 263 (2011) (“The plaintiff must offer sufficient evidence to
meet his or her burden of proof as if at trial.”).
157. Ohio Valley Radiology Assocs., Inc. v. Ohio Valley Hosp. Ass’n., 502 N.E.2d 599, 602
(Ohio 1986). Adopting the Bass interpretation, the Ohio Supreme Court explained: “The sole
responsibility of a defendant who has effectively contested the claimant’s allegations by pleading is to
refute the claimant’s case after the latter has established a prima facie case by proper evidence. If the
plaintiff cannot make out such a case, the defendant need not present any evidence at trial. Conversely,
once a case is at issue, it is improper for a court to enter judgment against a defendant without requiring
proof of the plaintiff’s claim.” Id.
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win on the merits, with the same preponderance of the evidence burden
of proof as the plaintiff would have at trial. Although proving a case on
the merits is arguably much easier without active participation from a
defendant, the difference between the minimal burden of proof under the
majority and minority approaches is substantial.
In Mickalis Pawn Shop, a victory on the merits for the City was not a
foregone conclusion, especially regarding the personal jurisdiction issue.
Judge Wesley’s concurrence contains a vehement rebuke of the district
court’s personal jurisdiction analysis and concludes that the lower court
incorrectly applied New York’s long-arm statute to find that Mickalis
Pawn and Adventure Outdoors were subject to personal jurisdiction in
New York.158 In examining the “quality and nature” of the defendants’
conduct, Judge Wesley determined that the defendants did not “transact
any business within the state or contract[ ] . . . to supply goods . . . in the
state,” or commit any tortious act within the state; nor did they conduct
or solicit any business in New York or “engage[ ] in any other persistent
course of conduct or derive[ ] substantial revenue from goods
used . . . in the state.”159 Nor was there any evidence to suggest that the
defendants knew or should have known of the consequences of their
conduct while deriving substantial revenue from interstate or
international commerce.160 Ultimately, Judge Wesley concluded that the
defendants nonetheless waived the personal jurisdiction defense through
pre-trial default.161 However, this shows that had Mickalis Pawn and
Adventure Outdoors not been held in default, the issue may have been
decided differently at trial or reversed on appeal. Furthermore, whether
the New York long-arm statute could be applied in public-nuisance suits
against nonresident firearms dealers was an issue of first impression,
which suggests that the case could have benefitted substantially from the
additional fact-finding that would probably have occurred at an ex parte
158. City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 147 (2d Cir. 2011) (Wesley,
J., concurring).
159. Id. at 148–49 (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a) (McKinney 2008)). Judge Wesley stated,
“Here, it is indisputable that defendants’ businesses are of a local character” and thus specifically
outside the reach of the New York long-arm statute. Id.
160. Mickalis Pawn Shop, 645 F.3d at 148; see also Asahi Metal Indus. v. California, 480 U.S.
102, 112 (1987) (“[A] defendant’s awareness that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the
product into the forum State does not convert the mere act of placing the product into the stream into an
act purposefully directed toward the forum State.”). Judge Wesley particularly took exception to the
District Court’s conclusion that the defendants’ “cumulative parallel conduct” was a proper basis for
finding personal jurisdiction. According to Judge Wesley’s analysis, this standard would establish
jurisdiction by showing that the defendants new that many others were engaged in “parallel” conduct,
even if each individual defendant’s conduct would be insufficient by itself to establish personal
jurisdiction. Judge Wesley argued that neither the Second Circuit nor the New York Court of Appeals
had ever interpreted New York’s long arm statute to allow for personal jurisdiction based on the
combined conduct of multiple defendants. Mickalis Pawn Shop, 645 F.3d at 149.
161. Mickalis Pawn Shop, 645 F.3d at 152.
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hearing, but for the default.162 Because the City of New York was
required at the pleading stage to show only a “substantial likelihood that
all the elements of jurisdiction could be established at trial,”163 the City
was absolved from meeting its burden of conclusively proving that all
the elements of the long-arm statute had been met by a preponderance of
the evidence.
V. CONCLUSION
Mickalis Pawn Shop exemplifies an atypical default judgment
situation where the defendants litigated vigorously throughout the
pretrial process before withdrawing in good faith. Under these
circumstances, the defendants displayed no intent to obstruct or delay
the proceedings. Following the minority rule and requiring the City of
New York to proceed to prove its claim on the merits in an ex parte
hearing by a preponderance of the evidence would not have caused
delay or prejudice. The policy rationales of Rule 55—avoiding delay
and ensuring speedy disposition of claims—were not implicated by the
facts of this case.
Furthermore, in light of the federal courts’ interest in deciding cases
on the merits, the district court should have exercised its discretion to
require the City to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
defendants’ conduct was covered by the New York long-arm statute,
especially because this was an issue of first impression. By finding that
the defendants had waived their jurisdictional defenses by defaulting,
the Second Circuit compounded the district court’s erroneous
application of Rule 55 and avoided serious analysis of a meritorious
defense by which the defendants could have possibly prevailed at trial or
on appeal.
Mickalis Pawn Shop therefore illustrates the shortcomings of the
majority interpretation of Rule 55. By not recognizing a post-answer
default, the minority rule is more consistent with the plain language,
history and policy objectives of Rule 55, as well as with the federal
courts’ preference for resolving cases on the merits. Federal courts must
consider these factors as they continue to refine Rule 55’s interpretation
and apply it to situations where, as in Mickalis Pawn Shop, a defendant
withdraws from litigation in good faith after responding to the
complaint. Finally, the federal courts must consider how the uncertainty
created by the circuit split affects defendants, and work towards
achieving more uniformity in the rule’s interpretation and application.

162. City of New York v. A-1 Jewelry & Pawn, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 2d 369, 374 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
163. Id.
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